We improve our former implementation of key generation for a cryptosystem OTU2000 with resistance to quantum computers. First, we give a polynomial time algorithm to determine a prime number satisfying a secret key condition. Next, on another secret key condition to guarantee the uniqueness of decoding, we prove a weaker sufficient condition than that in original OTU2000 and give an algorithm by this new condition. These allow us to choose secret keys from more combinations than before. Experimental results including our improvements are also shown. This will lead us to use OTU2000 without quantum computers.
Introduction
OTU2000 was proposed as a realized scheme of quantum public key cryptosystems and itself uses quantum computers to solve discrete logarithm problem for key generation [1] . But, it may be used right now as a cryptosystem with resistance to quantum computers if it can be implemented on classical computers. That is the motivation of this study. We could implement OTU2000 on classical computers by the results of this paper.
The algorithms and proofs are available from http://tnt.math.se.tmu.ac.jp/labo/master/2011/miyamoto/.
Let f ∈ Z[x] be a monic irreducible polynomial defining a number field K of degree r. Denote by Z K the ring of integers of K and by ω 1 , . . . , ω r an integral basis of K. For any t ∈ N, let A t ⊂ Z K be given by
Key generation of OTU2000 (Modified version by [2, 3])
Input: n, k ∈ N, k < n and f ∈ Z[x] Output: secret key (SK) and public key (PK)
1. Choose ℓ ∈ N suitably * 1 and let P be the set of prime elements of K in A 2ℓ .
2. Randomly take a subset S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } of n nonassociate * 2 elements of P .
3. Choose a rational odd prime number * 3 p prime to every element of S such that pZ K is a prime ideal of Z K satisfying the condition. * 4
5. Randomly choose d ∈ Z and, for 1
We increment ℓ so large as we can take S in the step 2. Non-associate primes occurred in the step 2 are collected by computing norms and conjugates, and P itself is not computed. * 2 We take S from the non-associate primes obtained in the step 1, which is not so efficient unless K is a simple field such as quadratic. We shall give a weaker condition for S than those in [1] [2] [3] and an easier method to obtain it in Section 5. * 3 There is no known algorithm to solve generally the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in polynomial time on classical computers. But, if we choose p so that p r − 1 is smooth, then it is possible to solve the DLP efficiently in the step 4 on classical computers. * 4 Efficient methods to determine p satisfying (2) are given by the original [1] for r = 1 or r = 2, K ̸ ⊂ R, and by our former [2, 3] for r = 2, K ⊂ R or r = 3. We shall give such a method for any r in Section 3.
Efficient test of condition (2)
By [1] [2] [3] , we can efficiently test the condition (2) in the key generation for degree r ≤ 3. There is, however, no efficient way to test it for r ≥ 4 yet. We now propose a method to test it efficiently for any degree r.
As a preparation, we introduce a binary operation ⋆ on Z K analogous to multiplication. Determine the structure constants
is not always satisfied. We must consider the order of ⋆ operation when we apply it successively. We have
by abuse of notation, fixing one such way. Further write
with a fixed way of applying ⋆ operation. Then
The result is valid for any fixed way of applying ⋆ operation.
This proposition means that the product of k integers in A 2ℓ always belongs to A p under the condition
Namely (4) implies (2) and we can take p in the step 3 of key generation in Section 2 by one ⋆ power computation. Instead of this ⋆ power, we may take a ⋆ product of k elements having coefficients bigger than the absolute values of those in S.
Complexity of ⋆ operation
We count the number of required multiplications in Z.
Precomputation
We precompute only once for K the structure con-
One ⋆ operation
multiplications in Z are required.
Powering
By Proposition 2, we may choose for our purpose any way to calculate the ⋆ power
By applying the repeated squaring method, this requires
Summarizing these results, we can check condition (4), which is sufficient for p in the step 3 of key generation in Section 2, in polynomial time with respect to the bit size log 2 k of a public key parameter k and the degree r of the number field K.
Weaker secret key condition
Let us now study the step 2 of key generation in Section 2. Original [1] requires the condition
for S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } in order to guarantee the uniqueness of decoding. Here N (g) denotes the norm of g ∈ K. We may obviously replace (5) by the weaker condition s 1 , . . . , s n are pairwise coprime.
As in Section 2, indeed [2, 3] take non-associate primes which may have the same norm. We further employ a weaker condition (7) bellow than (6) guaranteeing the uniqueness of decoding.
Proposition 3
The following condition for S ⊂ Z K guarantees the uniqueness of decoding of OTU2000:
Proof Easily shown by [1, Section 3.4] .
(QED)
This enables us to select elements of S from much wider range. For efficiency, we improve the steps 1 and 2 so that 
Then condition (7) holds.
This also allows us to take a key S from wider range.
Implementation by MAGMA
For this study, we have implemented the key generation, the encryption and the decryption algorithms, creating the following 3 files modifying our former implementation.
• qpkc gen.m 
Usage
The detail of each method is as follows. 
n the second parameter of qpkc gen k the third parameter of qpkc gen B array of positive rational integers f the first parameter of qpkc gen p positive rational integer which represent a prime ideal pZ in Z K g array of rational integers which represent a generator of the multiplicative group of finite field (Z K /pZ) d positive rational integer S array of n elements of (Z K /pZ). each element is represented by its coefficients.
Sample code
We can generate keys, encrypt and decrypt as follows. 
Experimental result
We show experimental results by the key generation program mentioned in the previous section.
Environment
The programs above are put on VMware Player 3.1.4. 
Processing time
We measured the processing time for every step of the key generation. Time-unit is "second" in the following. of s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n in the steps 1 and 2
Choice
Our implementation uses Proposition 4. The processing time depends on the parameter n and K. This is quite fast even though n is big.
Confirmation of condition (2) in the step 3
Proposition 2 is used. The processing time depends on the parameter n, k and field K. But, this process spends at most 0.2 seconds on any parameter. So, we skip to insert a table.
Search of a better p in the step 3
It becomes easy to solve the DLP in the step 4 by taking p such that p r − 1 is smooth. This is necessary for solving the DLP by classical computers. We move the parameter k in the range so that such a p is found within 1 minute. By the table below, it is harder when k grows big as p with (2) itself and p r also grow big. Compared to that, the influence from the size of n is less. 
Discrete logarithm in the step 4
We solve the DLP by the p found above. We must solve the n DLPs. This time, however, we solve 3 of them and estimate the time of solving the n DLPs. 
Density and pseudo density
If the density n/ log 2 max{b i } or the pseudo density k log 2 n/ log 2 max{b i } is less than 0.9408, then the key is considered to have a weak resistance to low density attack and is danger [5, p. 302] .
Density
Bigger n or smaller k, generating smaller p and b i , makes the density bigger. So, by appropriate choice of n, k, we can create a public key with its density greater than 0.9408 as below. 
Pseudo density
Unlike the density, we can hardly change the pseudo density apart from the way to change n, k. We cannot create any public key with its pseudo density greater than 0.9408. 
Conclusions for further research
Our main results are two significant refinements for generating secret keys of a number field based knapsack cryptosystem OTU2000. A binary operation ⋆ on Z K is newly introduced, and it makes us possible to generate a secret key p in polynomial time (Sections 3 and 4). A weaker condition of secret keys s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n is newly introduced assuring the uniqueness of decoding, and it makes us possible to generate them much faster and easier (Section 5). Several results of our implementation and experiment including these new methods are also reported in the last two sections, which shows that we are able to generate secret keys of OTU2000 in reasonable time for any number fields of any degree. We may say that it is now time to execute more experiment aiming practical use of OTU2000.
The experimental results above mean that raising up the pseudo density to 0.9408 is difficult. Hence, it is necessary to confirm the resistance against low density attack by experiment. Thus, we need to generate public keys in the step 4 of Section 2. But, it takes the longest time in the whole algorithm since we must solve the DLP. Therefore, our implementation always takes p having smooth p r − 1. The effect for security of taking such a p should be studied. By our experiment, however, as k grows bigger, taking such a p itself becomes more difficult. Therefore, calculation of the DLP should be improved to be faster. Probably, it will be done by implementing the index calculus method to run on the residue class field of any number field.
On the other hand, we should continuously make efforts to increase the pseudo density. Note that the pseudo density can be estimated by generating secret keys only. One idea is finding a more precise way than that in Section 5. It will also be useful for raising the pseudo density to increase the key space of s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n .
